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Teaching Philosophy of Law in Law
Schools: Some Cautionary Remarks
Patricia D. White

In many respects this Workshop can be construed as an optimistic occasion for the role of jurisprudence in the legal curriculum. There are many
more participants here than anyone expected and there would appear to be
substantial interest in the set of issues that we are addressing. Perhaps the
most useful thing for me to do on this optimistic occasion is to sound a
cautionary note, and along the way to distinguish several different issues
which ought to be focused on when thinking about the teaching of jurisprudence in an American law school.
Preliminarily, but as a first and underlying issue, we have to ask what we
mean when we are talking about "jurisprudence." This is a workshop on
jurisprudence, yet we have really been talking about substantive questions of
philosophy of law, traditionally conceived. Philosophy of law is clearly one
of the things that is meant by "jurisprudence" when people talk about the
teaching of jurisprudence in a law school. However, it is also not a trivial
question to ask exactly what philosophy of law is. On the one hand, as this
program reflects, philosophy of law is a branch of philosophy that is
concerned with a set of specifically philosophical general questions about
the law: questions about its nature, relationship to morality, and proper role
in the social structure. It is also a set of more specific philosophical questions about the law. Questions, for example, about theories and justifications of punishment, the nature of contracts, the nature and justification of
private property, and the like.
On the other hand, there is another conception of philosophy of law
which views it as a subject which gives distinctly philosophical treatment to
essentially legal questions. A well-known book which does this, for
example, is Hart's and Honore's book Causationin the Law. In its best parts
it is not really an essay about causation as a philosophical subject. Rather, it
is a philosophical essay about the use of causation in the law. One could
look at any number of legal topics from a philosophical point of view with
great profit. That kind of enterprise is also a part of philosophy of law,
although not necessarily a part of technical philosophy.
But philosophy of law, under any description, is not the only thing that
people mean by "jurisprudence" when they talk about a jurisprudence
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course in the legal curriculum. Sometimes they mean a sort of intellectual
history course; a course which surveys, in a fairly broad historical way, what
a variety of people have thought about some of these central issues. Such
courses, I suspect, constitute the bulk of the jurisprudence courses taught in
American law schools.
Another set of things that people mean by "jurisprudence" is harder to
specify. It is neither technical philosophy nor intellectual history. Rather, it
is anything that has to do with legal theory, broadly conceived. Normative
claims about the law are often regarded as jurisprudential claims. "Jurisprudential" is used frequently as an adjective and it is not clear what the
relationship is supposed to be between this adjectival use and the noun
"jurisprudence," but a systematic look at the way the language is in fact
used, would probably reveal that any claim about the law that has a normative flavor will be described by some as jurisprudential.
Whether or not this last broadly conceived set of things is properly viewed
as "jurisprudence," it does encompass issues and subjects which clearly have
a place in the law school curriculum. There are pedagogically feasible ways
of teaching them within the law school as it is currently structured. Let me
turn instead to the role of philosophy of law in the law school curriculum
and raise a general kind of skepticism as to whether any but very basic
courses in technical philosophy of law can be fit into it.
Law students at American law schools are people who have undergraduate
degrees in a wide variety of fields. Many, of course, have advanced degrees as
well. Nonetheless they come to law school as neophytes in the law; graduate
students in some sense, but not graduate students of law. As a result, when
you convene a class which you intend to be a course in philosophy of law,
you end up with an enormous mix of backgrounds. Typically, some students
have never had a philosophy course in their lives; others have had very fine
graduate training; and, in between these two extremes, there is the entire
range of background. For the most part, however, the students are not philosophically sophisticated. It is for good reasons that philosophy departments,
like any other department which offers advanced courses, have prerequisites
to their upper level courses. Law students, as a group, have not met any of
the prerequisites, and it simply is not appropriate to try to teach a very
sophisticated philosophy of law course in a law school.
Let me give you two examples, one from my own experience and one from
our shared experience. When I was a law student and a graduate student at
the University of Michigan, John Rawls had just published A Theory of
Justice.A Theory of Justicewent through a period when, rather curiously in
my view, it became the book that everybody who was anybody in educated
America had to read. Rawls became rather a folk hero-an unlikely folk hero
for those of you who know him, since he is a very serious moral philosopher.
The University of Michigan Law School arranged to have Rawls visit for a
term. He was to teach a seminar which was going to be cross"listed in the law
school and the philosophy department. Before the seminar began you could
walk down the halls of the law school and see many students carrying a thick
green paperback book. The first meeting of the seminar was held and it was
standing room only. Many of the law faculty were there, along with a full
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complement of law students and a good-sized group of philosophy graduate
students. Rawls, who is a wonderful philosopher, is not a very dynamic or
scintillating lecturer. And he gave the sort of lecture that he would ordinarily
give to a graduate course in philosophy. Throughout the next week people
walked through the law school carrying their thick green paperback books.
The second class was well attended, but at least you could get a seat. Rawls
taught the class in his customary style. During the next week the thick green
books magically disappeared. They were replaced in peoples' hands by the
thick brown, red, and blue hardback books which typically are carried by law
students as they walk between classes. By the third session, although the class
continued to meet in the law school, the seminarians consisted of the philosophy graduate students and a couple of faculty members from the law
school. It was a good course.
The lesson to learn is obvious. Rawls' book is a very, very hard book. Now
you can read it at one level and probably get a fair amount out of it, but to
read it the way Rawls would like you to read it or to talk about it the way
Rawls would be prepared to talk about it, simply cannot be done by people
who do not know anything about moral theory or political theory. It is not a
good basic book.
My other example is provided by a session of this Workshop. John
Finnis's book is a deep, ambitious book which is essentially, or at least in
significant part, a book about moral philosophy. I would challenge us to
bring in law students, no matter how smart, who had never had a course in
ethics or who had never thought systematically (whether in a course or
otherwise) about moral theory and ask them if they understood the exchange
between Don Regan and John Finnis. They would not, they could not. Yet
that is the level at which the book is written and it is the level at which it is
meant to be discussed. One cannot go into a law school classroom with
students prepared as ours are and give them books like these to read and to
talk about, if what you are trying to do is to teach them legal philosophy.
You cannot make up for their lack of philosophical background, as many of
us are tempted to do, simply by requiring them to read more. Philosophical
reading is necessarily slow reading. The hallmark of reading something
seriously is to read it slowly. Beginning philosophy students cannot read a
book a week. They probably cannot read a book every three weeks if you are
talking about books of this sort. It takes a long time to read such books and
to think about them.
When I say that it is not appropriate to teach a very sophisticated philosophy of law course to law students, I am assuming a pure pedagogical
motive; anamely, a desire that students genuinely come to grips with the
material. However, other pedagogical motives might justify offering such a
course. Perhaps, for example, the motivation might be the desire to expose
students to material simply to expose them to the fact that there is this whole
other world out there and not with any thought that they are going to master
it. After all, there is much to be gained from reading Rawls or Finnis even if
these books are not fully accessible to the reader. Even if he cannot appreciate
it fully, the reader has learned something. But unless you make sure that the
students in this kind of course understand that the material is not fully
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accessible to them, you run the real risk of producing people who think that
they understand a subject when they do not. There is the danger of
producing people who are charlatans in the sense that they do not recognize
their own limitations.
The pedagogical problems associated with philosophy of law are typical
of those generally associated with interdisciplinary work. Interdisciplinary
studies of various sorts have enjoyed increasing vogue in recent years; philosophy of law is just one of many examples. With all interdisciplinary studies
it is crucial that the students realize that they are seeing the mixture of (at
least) two disciplines and that, ideally, one would know something about
each of the component fields before one presumed to be able to make interesting connections between them. There are a wide variety of ways to acquire
an education in a field in which you have had no formal training, but you
have to work hard. There are no shortcuts. An interdisciplinary course is
unlikely to provide the necessary background to itself. A student should
learn something about each discipline before the connections can be fully
appreciated. This simple fact is too little realized. We must work very hard to
keep both ourselves and our students from falling into the trap of assuming
that there are shortcuts.
There is something very discomforting about the thought that it does not
make pedagogical sense to teach advanced courses about the nature of and
the conceptual foundations of law in our law schools. But the fact is.that we
have arranged our curriculum so that it does not. We do not, for example,
have sequences of courses of increasing sophistication. Sequencing is done
in every other discipline. One starts with the basic course and moves up from
there. After the fundamentals have been mastered (or at least grappled with),
the student is prepared to learn something about the subject in a more
sophisticated form. We do not do anything like this in our philosophy of law
courses. Moreover, curiously enough, we do very little of it in law schools at
all.
If I am right that we are saddled in law schools with a curriculum which is
systematically arranged so that it does not make sense to teach' advanced
courses about the foundations of law or the nature of law, we are left being
able to teach only a pretty basic sort of course. We have the same set of
choices available to us that other teachers of philosophy who are teaching
introductory philosophy courses have available to them. We can teach a
problems course or we can teach a sirfple version of a systematic foundations
course. In each case law teachers have a significant advantage over people
who are teaching philosophy to undergraduates at the beginning of their
studies and that is simply that we have a set of students who do know
something about the law. This puts us in a position to do something more
with the interdisciplinary nature of the course than we otherwise could. This
advantage is particularly ripe to be exploited in a problems course, a view
which is apparently shared by Herbert Hart. He gave the following advice to
a former student of his about to undertake the teaching of a law school
course in philosophy of law:
The books that you list on page 2 of your letter are, I think, the right ones if you are going
to approach the subject in that way. That is to say by starting with an account of different
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theories and getting your audience to read as much of them as possible. What I doubt is
that this is the right way to start, especially with an American audience. Ought you not
really begin with some object like criminal responsibility, the theory of punishment, or
civil disobedience, or the judicial process which will both have much more obvious close
personal contact with the law which they are studying and with identifiable problems in
which they can be expected already to have some interest. My own inclination would
certainly be to start in this way and to let the general theories of law encompassed by your
book list arise out of these more concrete problems to be dealt with at the end, rather than
the beginning, of the course. I am sure in this way what might appear to students as too
dry and abstract a subject can be linked to concrete issues. In other words I don't think that
they should be invited to consider general theories of law until they have seen how
probing in depth some concrete issue will lead into theory. This approach does require a
good deal of work and careful planning but I think it is worthwhile.

Let me return to my original framework. If I am right that our system of
legal education in America makes it difficult or impossible to teach advanced
courses in technical philosophy of law, another question arises. At the outset
I said that you can think of philosophy of law as encompassing general
kinds of questions, as well as somewhat more specific questions, and as a
branch of technical philosophy. However, there is another way to conceive
of philosophy of law. It is to think about it as the use of the tools of philosophical analysis in thinking about legal subjects or legal topics. To the extent
that this is what we mean when we talk about teaching jurisprudence in law
schools, there is much cause for optimism. Even if the students are not
formally introduced to these tools, as they xvould be in a sequence of philosophy courses, the more that they see the tools used, the more likely they are
to learn to use them for themselves. This is another instance of the pervasive
method of learning which is so characteristic of legal education. If we can
encompass in the phrase "legal analysis" these other kinds of analytical
tools, then these things too will become part of the vocabulary and part of
the arsenal of lawyers. This can lead to more careful work on their part as
they develop the instinct to make distinctions, "as they learn how to parse
arguments, and as they learn how better to think systematically about legal
problems. In short, it can make them better lawyers and better educated
human beings.
To the extent that you are talking about jurisprudence as a course in
intellectual history-a sort of great books course if you will-there can be no
doubt that it can be taught effectively and well and that such a journey ought
to be made somehow by every educated lawyer. How to go about teaching
that sort of course raises a whole set of separate issues, issues which I do not
propose to go into here.

